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It is this: *LAJ* is hard to talk about in the abstract. One reason for that is that it is there, right in front of our (contemporary or modern lawyers) noses. So close, indeed, that we almost can't see it. Furthermore, not only is it so close, it is also very nearly ubiquitous, albeit not in the sense of being always and ever explicitly in play: its absence is often as telling as its presence, making lawyers suspicious of law's so narrowly drafted that they all but name a person, group or class or bodies of law that lack systematicity or generality. A good way of bringing this very close but not quite ubiquitous feature of the modern legal landscape into focus is to point to particular instances or aspects of it. That is how I began *Law's Judgement* and how, as Haris notes, I respond to a few of the arguments offered by jurists against *LAJ*.

One could dub this a 'bottom up' approach, the 'bottom' being particular juridical instances of *LAJ*. The usual contrast is with a 'top-down' approach which was characterised thus by Jules Coleman: "In top down explanations, the theorist begins with what she takes to be the set of norms that would gain our reflective acceptance... Then she looks at the body of law... and tries to reconstruct it plausibly as exemplifying those norms. Parts of the law... may fail to be plausibly reconstructed... and identified as mistakes".[14] I do not think that one approach or the other is always obviously better nor do I believe that there is an *a priori* truth here to guide us. If Haris accepts that too, then the only thing that sets us apart is our different approaches to *LAJ*. That counts as a genuine difference but it is not, I think, one which will yield a great substantive divergence, generating radically incompatible accounts of *LAJ*'s value.

[14] *Risks and Wrongs* (Cambridge University Press 1992) 8. Coleman's point of contrast is not bottom-up approaches but middle-level theory: ibid. In what seems like a previous life I complained about both: see section III of my 'Rethinking the Common Law' (1994) *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 539-564.