Ciencias de la mente y responsabilidad jurídica: dos retos

Fernando Efraín Rudy Hiller

Resumen

Este artículo evalúa el impacto de las ciencias de la mente y el compor-tamiento sobre el concepto y la práctica de la responsabilidad jurídica, particu-larmente sobre el derecho penal. Existen dos posiciones polares al respecto: por un lado, hay quie-nes sostienen que las ciencias de la mente muestran que la responsabilidad (jurídica y moral) es una quimera y por tanto que los sistemas jurídicos existentes deben ser radi-calmente revisados. Por el otro, hay quienes piensan que, dado que las prácticas de atri-bución de responsabilidad son prácticas normativas, éstas son fundamentalmente inmu-nes a los descubrimientos científicos acerca del comportamiento humano. Contra ambas posiciones, argumento que dichos descubrimientos, si bien no muestran que la psicología de sentido común en la que se basa el derecho penal está fundamentalmente equivocada, tampoco son irrelevantes para evaluar su corrección. Defiendo esta tesis apelando a los descubrimientos de la psicología social situacionista, los cuales, sostengo, desmienten uno de los supuestos centrales de aquélla, a saber, el supuesto de que las capacidades racio-nales constitutivas de la agencia responsable son estables a través de distintos contextos. Finalmente, ilustro la relevancia de esta conclusión para el derecho examinando las “le-yes del buen samaritano”, las cuales imponen sanciones penales a quienes no ayudan a otros en situaciones de emergencia.

Palabras clave

Responsabilidad jurídica; psicología de sentido común; psicología social; capacidades ra-cionales; leyes del buen samaritano

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