El razonamiento jurídico bajo giros dialógicos y procedimentales

Gabriel Alejandro Encinas Duarte
Resumen

Este artículo se propone identificar los rasgos de la argumentación jurídica bajo las innovaciones asociadas al constitucionalismo dialógico y a los giros procedimentales en la jurisdicción. Se sigue una reconstrucción crítica de conceptos a partir de dos oposiciones cruzadas diferentes para ambos desarrollos: Primero, con respecto a las propuestas asociadas al giro dialógico, se ofrece un balance de cómo sus justificaciones se relacionan con el “poder” y la “voz”, así como a espacios formales e informales de deliberación. Segundo, la discusión de un giro procedimental en el razonamiento jurídico se estructura a partir de la distinción entre razonamientos basados en el “sistema” y en el “caso”, así como entre las razones “excluyentes” y “de fondo”. Como resultado, se reconoce una prioridad explicativa a los estándares de escrutinio que incorporan razones derivadas de procedimientos deliberativos, reforzando la posibilidad de control democrático por parte de aquellos sujetos a las decisiones. Este artículo es principalmente analítico y reconstructivo, integrando diversos debates bajo un marco común. Su originalidad reside principalmente en la propuesta de una matriz novedosa de criterios con los cuales comparar la diversidad de los debates relacionados con un giro dialógico y otro procedimental, en el razonamiento jurídico mismo. Por último, las distintas innovaciones se plantean menos como alternativas y más como complementos a la discusión material que supone una toma de decisiones democrática.

Palabras clave:
constitucionalismo dialógico, giro procedimental, poder y voz, razones excluyentes, estándares jurídicos

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Encinas Duarte, G. A. (2025). El razonamiento jurídico bajo giros dialógicos y procedimentales. Problema. Anuario De Filosofía Y Teoría Del Derecho, 19(19), e19513. https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24487937e.2025.19.19513

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