¿Es el derecho un artefacto?
Este artículo examina si el derecho es un artefacto y, de ser así, qué tipo de artefacto es. A partir de la teoría general de los artefactos —en particular, la formulación canónica de Hilpinen— el autor sostiene que, si bien el derecho es indudablemente una creación humana con una función y un propósito, no puede caracterizarse adecuadamente como un mero artefacto (social). El artículo revisita las condiciones estandarizadas de un artefacto (Dependencia, Éxito, Aceptación y Evaluación) y muestra que estas deben ser enmendadas y ampliadas para dar cuenta de los rasgos distintivos del derecho. En particular, el autor argumenta que la naturaleza artefactual del derecho no deriva principalmente de una intención productiva autorial, sino de una intención reproductiva colectiva —esto es, de su reconocimiento como institucional y autoritativamente vinculante. Apoyado en la teoría de los hechos institucionales de Searle y en la distinción entre funciones desempeñadas en virtud de características físicas brutas y funciones desempeñadas mediante la aceptación colectiva, el artículo sostiene la tesis de que el derecho se comprende mejor como la institucionalización autoritativa de la moralidad: una institución compleja que comprende múltiples subinstituciones, caracterizada no solo por la producción y la reproducción, sino por el reconocimiento colectivo, lo que le permite imponer un estatus institucional adicional sobre otras entidades. El artículo concluye que, a diferencia de los artefactos más simples, el derecho posee una naturaleza evolutiva e interpretativa que exige una evaluación y revaluación, así como una interpretación y reinterpretación continuas.
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