Human Brain Plasticity as a Limiting Factor in the Use of Artificial Intelligence as a Tool in Legal Argumentation
This article explores the cognitive and legal limits of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the context of legal argumentation, by using a hermeneutic methodology focused on Mexican amparo proceedings. While AI has become an increasingly valuable tool for legal professionals, optimizing time and automating tasks such as the drafting of lawsuits, agreements, and legal documents, its capacity to engage in complex legal reasoning remains questionable. This article analyzes whether AI can properly build conceptos de violación up, the argumentative core of Amparo, which require a deeper axiological and ontological assessment that surpasses algorithmic programming. The central hypothesis of this article is that, despite recent advancements in natural language processing and machine learning, AI cannot replicate human brain plasticity, which allows jurists to interpret, adapt, and argue within ethical, social, and constitutional contexts. Employing a dogmatic and legal-philosophical methodology, this article examines the structure of Amparo, the theoretical foundations of legal argumentation, and the cognitive requirements for higher-level legal reasoning. The conclusion is that AI can serve as an instrumental support in legal practice, but it faces inherent limitations when confronted with the axiological and interpretive challenges of constitutional law.
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