The Rejection of Executory Contracts: A Comparative Economic Analysis

Susana Dávalos

Abstract

This article describes three models used around the world for the treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy. An economic analysis is made of the ex post incentives of the bankruptcy trustee to reject the contract under each model, based on Jesse Fried’s article Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions. This article states that the approach used by Spain is likely to create the most efficient ex post incentives. The contribution of this article is to further the discussion on the treatment of executory contracts in bankruptcy, as it continues to be one of the main day-to-day issues at bankruptcy courts.

Keywords

Insolvency proceedings; bankruptcy; liquidation; conciliation; insolvency; bilateral contracts; executory contracts; efficiency; economic analysis; United States; Germany; Spain

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