Ronald Dworkin’s Legal Non-Positivism: Main Characteristics 1and its Confrontation with Legal Positivism of the Twentieth Century (H.L.A. Hart)

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Gabriela G. Valles Santillán

Abstract

This note is based on the legal non-positivist model of Ronald Dworkin, developed in important works such as Taking rights seriously, Law’s Empire, and Freedom’s Law —the moral reading of the American Constitution—. Furthermore, the consultation of the work of this jurist is taken into account, because in it a theory of justice is developed —Justice for Hedgehogs—. This note is complemented with the reference of other authors to confront this model with the legal positivism view of the Twentieth Century, in particular with the positivist legal model of H.L.A. Hart. The main purpose is to show extracts that are considered significant to the theoretical principialist Dworkinian model of law, in order to understand and distinguish this cognitive-moral non-positivist type of model. Therefore, an emphasis on fundamental rights and the exposure of the premise regarding the only correct solution, or the only answer to legal controversies submitted to the analysis of the judges in difficult cases —the so-called hard cases— is taken into account.

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