Voting power in subregional multilateral development banks in Latin America and the Caribbean-The case of the CAF

Ximing Yang
Abstract

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are international institutions that provide financial assistance for the development of their member states. Decision-making of MDBs is undertaken by the representatives of shareholders by voting. This article uses the absolute Banzhaf power index to measure the voting power of the shareholders of subregional MDBs, which have a voting system with a layered structure of different stock classifications. Differences in the voting power of shareholders holding different classifications of stocks are analyzed. The article also aims to explore the influence of the special voting system in the protection of the voting power in developing countries in the subregional MDBs of Latin America and the Caribbean. This protection benefits the democracy and independence of countries in the region.

Keywords:
MDBs, MDBs´ voting systems, decision-making power, democratic principles, Latin American development

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Article Details

How to Cite
Yang, X. (2025). Voting power in subregional multilateral development banks in Latin America and the Caribbean-The case of the CAF. Mexican Law Review, 17(2), 109–133. https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2025.2.19016

References

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